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Abstract
A multi-country Schumpeterian growth model is constructed when there is world-
wide externality in technological knowledge. Households can enter the labour
force as workers or become engineers at some cost. Production employs both
workers and engineers while R&D uses only engineers. Workers are unionized
and labour market regulation supports union power in wage bargaining. It is
shown that international coordination of labour market policy increases the
growth rate and the level of welfare. When the interest-rate elasticity of
consumption in the world is low (high), the simultaneous regulation
(deregulation) of the labour market in all countries increases welfare.
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written.1 Introduction
Labour market regulation (deregulation) – i.e. the strengthening (weakening)
of the workers’ position in wage bargaining – may have strong eﬀects on the
level of employment, the growth rate and the level of welfare. This leads
to the following problems. To what extent should a single country, which
is dependent of technological knowledge in the other countries, regulate its
labour market? Should labour market policy be internationally coordinated
or should the countries be left alone to compete with each other by labour
market deregulation? Should, for instance, the European Union be given
a greater importance in labour market policy or should this be left for the
national governments? This study tries to answer these questions.
In Jerger (2002), regulation and social standards are endogenously de-
termined by politicians who have to solve a trade-oﬀ between equity and
eﬃciency and whose utility is a quadratic function of some macroeconomic
variables. In contrast, this study ignores such trade-oﬀ by assuming that
the households in a country are similar and the government maximizes a
household’s welfare. It is shown that when technological change is properly
incorporated into the model, eﬃciency can alone explain why a rational and
benevolent government exercises labour market regulation.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) (in ch. 4), Aghion and Howitt (1998),
and W¨ alde (1999) examine economic growth from the viewpoint of creative
destruction in which ﬁrms can step forward in the quality ladders of technol-
ogy by investment on R&D. The study takes here a similar ’Schumpeterian’
approach, but instead of a competitive labour market it assumes that unions
and employers bargain over wages. The wages are then determined by a
two-player game in which the parties are long-sighted enough to observe the
eﬀect of wages on the ﬁrms’ investment policy.
Palokangas (1996, 2000) introduces collective bargaining into Romer’s
(1990) product-variety model with two labour inputs, skilled and unskilled
workers, and obtains the following results. Higher bargaining power for
unions leads to higher wages for unskilled workers, higher unemployment
for both skilled and unskilled workers in production, a lower wage for skilled
workers, a larger amount of R&D which uses skilled labour, and a higher
growth rate. If the unions are not initially too strong, this increase in the
2growth rate is welfare enhancing. The product-variety models, however, ig-
nore the uncertainty that is embodied in technological change. To eliminate
this shortcoming, the study uses a model of creative destruction.
In the model, there is a ﬁxed number J of countries that are interdepen-
dent through international technology transfer. Each country j contains a
ﬁxed number κ of households.1 All households are modelled as dynastic fam-
ilies whose size remains unchanged over time. They are risk averters, share
identical preferences and supply two labour inputs: workers, who are em-
ployed only in production, and engineers, who are employed in both produc-
tion and R&D. Family-optimization considerations determine the evolution
of consumption expenditure over time, the allocation of savings across shares
in diﬀerent ﬁrms, and the decision whether to become engineers or enter the
labour force as workers. A single family takes prices, wages, proﬁts, the level
of employment and aggregate labour supply as given.
Research ﬁrms can adopt ideas from each other. A single ﬁrm has tech-
nology which is a random variable but the probability of an improvement of
its technology in one unit of time is an increasing function of both its and
the other ﬁrms’ R&D. To focus on this technological transfer as the main
connection between countries, this study assumes that there is no interna-
tional trade in goods or factors and each intermediate product is speciﬁc
to the country in which it is used and produced.2 Given this assumption,
each country can have a separate stochastic process that characterizes its
technological change and the growth rates can diﬀer across the countries.
The structure of a single country can be characterized as follows:
(i) A large number of competitive ﬁrms produces ﬁnal goods from the inter-
mediate good and some indivisible factor of production.3
(ii) One monopolist at a time produces the intermediate good by workers
and engineers. Several ﬁrms do R&D by using engineers and ﬁnance
their expenditure by issuing shares. As soon as any of these ﬁrms
1It is necessary for the analysis that each country contains a large but ﬁnite number of
households. The model would be a bit more complicated but the results still the same if
the number of households diﬀered across the countries.
2Howitt (2000) makes the same assumption for the same reason.
3It is assumed, for simplicity, only one intermediate good for each country. With some
complication, the same results can be derived even with many intermediate goods.
3completes a new innovation, it takes over the whole production of the
intermediate good and drives the old producer out of the market.
(iii) The households decide on their labour supply before entering the labour
market. They save in shares in research ﬁrms of their own countries.
(iv) All workers are unionized.4 The labour union, which maximizes the
discounted value of the ﬂow of the workers’ wage bill, and the employer
federation, which maximizes the discounted value of the ﬂow of the
employers’ proﬁt, bargain over the workers’ wages. The labour union
has also the option to refuse from bargaining, in which case the workers’
wage is competitively determined.
(v) The government determines the relative bargaining power of the labour
union by its labour market policy. When the policy measures increase
(decrease) the labour union’s relative bargaining power, we say that
the labour market is regulated (deregulated).
Section 3 considers households deciding on consumption and saving. This
is a problem of stochastic dynamic programming and leads to the savings
and investment functions for the countries. The study focuses entirely on
the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is
invariable across technologies, and ignores the behaviour of the system during
the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. Section 4 examines
collective bargaining in the households’ stationary state. Finally, section
5 considers the national governments which act as Stackelberg leaders with
respect to the other agents. Two cases are examined: either the governments
play Nash among themselves or they cooperate in labour market policy.
4This study assumes that the engineers are not unionized, for simplicity. In the larger
version of this paper [Palokangas (2002)], both workers and engineers belong to the same
union. Then, in line with Palokangas (1996) and (2000), it is shown that because a higher
employment for engineers yields higher proﬁts and higher labour income, the union and the
employer will always make such wage contracts that the engineers will be fully employed.
Given the full employment of engineers, the other results are the same as in this study.
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(a) Final-good producers. The representative ﬁnal-good ﬁrm in country j
makes output yj from some indivisible factor of production and intermediate
input xj through a Cobb-Douglas function
yj = Bjx
1−β
j /(1 − β) with 0 < β < 1, (1)
where Bj is the productivity parameter and β a constant. It maximizes proﬁt
Πj
. = Pjyj − pjxj = PjBjx
1−β
j /(1 − β) − pjxj (2)
by intermediate input xj, taking the input price pj and the output price Pj




(b) Intermediate-good producers. Input xj is produced through technology
xj = X(mj,nj), Xm
. = ∂X/∂mj > 0, Xn
. = ∂X/∂nj > 0, (4)
where mj (nj) is the demand for engineers (workers) in production. Assuming
that technology (4) is of CES form, the unit cost ψj is determined by




j + (1 − δ)v
1−ε
j
1/(1−ε), 0 < δ < 1, 0 < ε < 1, (5)
where wj (vj) is the wage for engineers (workers), ε the constant elasticity
of substitution, and δ the constant relative weight of engineers. Assumption
ε < 1 is the Inada condition for CES technology: there cannot be output
















Xm/Xn = wj/vj, xj = Xmmj + Xnnj. (6)
Given the demand function (3), the producer maximizes its proﬁt
πj
. = pjxj − ψjxj = PjBjx
1−β
j − ψjxj = PjBjx
1−β
j − ψjxj (7)
5by its output xj, taking its unit cost ψj and the price for the ﬁnal good, Pj,
as ﬁxed. Given (2)-(7), this yields













(1 − β)2. (8)
(c) Research ﬁrms. Because only engineers are used in R&D, investment
expenditure in country j is equal to labour cost wjlj, where lj is the engineers’
labour input in R&D. When a research ﬁrm in country j is successful, it
uses its new technology to drive the old producer out and starts producing
good j itself. Its proﬁts are then distributed among those who had ﬁnanced
it. When R&D is not successful for a ﬁrm, there is no proﬁt and the ex post
value of a share of the ﬁrm is zero.
Country j is subject to technological change which is characterized by a
Poisson process qj as follows. During a short time interval dt, there is an
innovation dqj = 1 with probability Λjdt, and no innovation dqj = 0 with
probability 1−Λjdt, where Λj is the arrival rate of innovations in the research
process. It is assumed that the arrival rate Λj is in ﬁxed proportion λ to a
Cobb-Douglas function Zj of research input in the country j, lj, and the
average research input in the rest of the world, l−j:











0 < µ < 1, ∂Zj/∂µ = 0 and ∂
2Zj/(∂lj∂µ) = −1 < 0 for lj = l−j. (9)
The higher parameter µ is, the more the countries are technologically depen-
dent on each other. Each new generation of products provides exactly γ > 1
times as many services as the product of the generation before it. Hence,
the level of productivity Bj is determined by the currently most advanced
technology t. The invention of a new technology raises t by one and the level









j − ln Bt
j = (lnγ)χ(t), where χ(t) is the number of inno-
vations between t and t + 1, and χ(t) is Poisson distributed with parameter
λZj, the average growth rate of the level of productivity Bj in the station-
ary state is in ﬁxed proportion to Zj as E[log B
t+1
j − log Bt
j] = λZj logγ,






−j can be used as proxies of the average growth rates of the
countries j ∈ {1,...,J}.
3 Households
Households make two choices separately: (a) they decide their occupation on
the basis of prospective income; and (b) they determine the ﬂow of savings
given the ﬂow of income. The outcome of these choices are as follows.
(a) Labour supply. Because each family can change its members’ occupation
from a worker to an engineer at some cost and the abilities of all individuals
in country j diﬀer, we can introduce a decreasing and convex transformation
function between the number of workers, Nj, and the number of engineers,
Lj, as follows:
Nj = N(Lj), N
0 < 0, N
00 < 0. (11)
More and more workers must be transformed in order to create one more
engineering input. Engineers are always fully employed. Because the workers
are used only in production, their full employment constraint is given by
nj ≤ Nj = N(Lj), (12)
where nj is the level of employment and Nj the labour supply. A worker’s
expected wage ve
j
. = vjnj/Nj is equal to the wage vj times the probability of
employment, nj/Nj. Since the supply of the engineers is always equal to the
demand for them, Lj = lj + mj, their expected wage is the wage wj.
Because households must choose their combination of labour supply be-
fore entering the labour market, this choice is based on the transforma-
tion function (11) and the expected wages (wj,ve
j), which the household
takes as given. This equilibrium is found by maximizing expected income
wjLj + ve
jNj = wjLj + ve
jN(Lj) by Lj, which yields the ﬁrst order condition
wj/ve
j = −N0(Lj). This, (11) and deﬁnition ve
j















5For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
7(b) Saving. The utility for household ι ∈ {1,...,κ} in country j from an







−ρ(θ−τ)dθ with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (14)
where θ is time, E the expectation operator, Cjι the index of consumption, ρ
the rate of time preference and 1/(1−σ) is the constant relative risk aversion.











Cjι = 1, (15)
where Pj is the price for the ﬁnal good in country j.
When household ι has ﬁnanced a successful R&D project, it acquires the
right to a certain share of proﬁts the successful ﬁrm earns in the production
of ﬁnal goods. Since the old producer is driven out of the market, all shares
held in it lose their value. Let sjι be the true proﬁt share of household ι
when the uncertainty of the outcome of the projects are taken into account.
Following W¨ alde (1999), we assume that the change in this share, dsjι, is a
function of the increment dqj of a Poisson process qj as follows:
dsjι = (ijι − sjι)dqj with ijι
. = Sjι/(wjlj), (16)
where Sjι is saving by household ι in country j. When a household does not
invest in the upcoming vintage, her share holdings are reduced to zero in
the case of research success dqj = 1. If it invests, then the amount of share
holdings depends on its relative investment in the vintage.
Total labour income in country j, Ij is equal to labour expenditure in
production, ψjxj, and in R&D, wjlj,
Ij
. = wjlj + ψjxj. (17)
The total income of household ι in country j, Ajι, consists of an equal share
1/κ of both labour income Ij and the proﬁt of the ﬁnal-good ﬁrm, Πj, and
the share sjι of the total proﬁts of the intermediate-good ﬁrm, πj,
Ajι
. = (Ij + Πj)/κ + sjπj = (wjlj + ψjxj + Πj)/κ + sjιπj. (18)
8The budget constraint of household ι in country j is given by
Ajι = PjCjι + Sjι, (19)
where Cjι is consumption and Pj the consumption price. Household ι chooses
its saving Sjι and takes labour income Ij, proﬁts Πj and πj, investment
expenditure wjlj and aggregate research input Zj as given.
(c) Optimization. We denote the value of receiving a share sjι of the proﬁts
of the monopolists using current technology t by Ω(sjι,t), and the value of
receiving a share ijι of the proﬁts of the monopolists of the next generation
by Ω(ijι,t + 1). Household ι maximizes its utility (14) subject to stochastic
process (16) and the budget constraint (19) by its saving Sjι, given Ij, Πj,






jι + Λj[Ω(ijι,t + 1) − Ω(sjι,t)]
o
, (20)




−j by (9) and (19). The




[Ω(ijι,t + 1) − Ω(sjι,t)] = σC
σ−1
jι /Pj. (21)
We try the solution that consumption expenditure PjCjι is a share
0 ≤ 1/hjι ≤ 1 out of income Ajι, and that the value function is of the form
Ω = (Ajι/hjι)σ/rjι, where the income-consumption ratio hjι and the (subjec-
tive) interest rate rjι are independent of income Ajι. Inserting these guesses
into (20) and (21), it is shown in Appendix A that the interest rate rj and
the ratio of the labour costs in the two sectors for country j are given by7
rjι = rj
. = ρ + (1 − γ
σ)λZj, (22)
wjlj/(ψjxj) = $[h(Zj) − 1], h
0 > 0 and $ > 0 constant. (23)
4 Employment and wage bargaining
In the system of six diﬀerentiable equations (4), (5), (6), (13) and (23), there
are six endogenous variables – the unit cost ψj, the engineers’ and workers’
6Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
7Note that this deﬁnition of the interest rate rj contains also the expected growth of
consumption through technological change (10).
9wages, wj and vj, the intermediate input xj and the employment of engineers
and workers in production, mj and nj – and two exogenous variables – the
employment of engineers in R&D, lj, and the level of R&D, Zj. This system
deﬁnes the following diﬀerentiable functions (see Appendix B):
wj = w(lj,Zj), vj = v(lj,Zj), mj = m(lj,Zj), nj = n(lj,Zj),
xj = x(lj,Zj), ∂xj/∂lj < 0. (24)
Result ∂xj/∂lj < 0 means that the increase of resources in R&D (i.e., a
higher lj) deprives resources from production and yields lower output xj.






In each country j, the workers’ wage vj is determined by collective bar-
gaining between labour union j, which represents the workers, and employer
federation j, which represents ﬁrms that employ workers. It is assumed, for
simplicity, that these both are risk neutral and have the same rate of time
preference % > 0. Union j attempts then to maximize the expected value of
the stream of the workers’ real wage bill vjnj/Pj, Uj, while employer federa-
tion j attempts to maximize the expected value of the stream of real proﬁts
πj/Pj, Fj.8 Given the stochastic technological progress explained in part (c)
of section 2, these targets take the form:9













% + (1 − γ)λZj
,













% + (1 − γ)λZj
. (26)
Union j has always the possibility of refusing from collective bargaining
in which case the workers’ wage vj is determined by supply and demand and
there is full employment. That is why union j cannot make an agreement that
8Because the workers and the employers consume the ﬁnal good, their real income is
deﬁned by the ﬁnal-good price Pj. If the employer federation represented also the ﬁnal-
goods ﬁrms, then it would maximize the discounted value of the stream of the real proﬁts
(πj + Πj)/Pj of both the intermediate and ﬁnal-goods ﬁrms rather than the discounted
value of the stream of πj/Pj. However, because in the model Πj is in ﬁxed proportion to
πj, the results were the same.
9For this, see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 61.
10produces a lower welfare for its members than in full employment. Denoting
the level of employment corresponding to full employment nj = Nj by l
f
j and




In bargaining, union j (employer federation j) maximizes its welfare Uj
(Fj) by the workers’ wage vj subject to the employment constraints (25) and
the union’s incentive constraint (27), taking the number of engineers devoted
to R&D elsewhere, l−j, as given. Because there is one-to-one correspondence
from vj to lj through (24), in the model vj can be replaced by lj as the in-
strument of bargaining. The outcome of bargaining is then obtained through




j , where constant 0 < α < 1 is the union’s relative bargaining power,
by lj, subject to (25) and (27), taking l−j as given. This maximization yields
the following results (Appendix C):
Proposition 1 (i) With unemployment for the workers, Nj > nj, the em-
ployment of engineers in R&D, lj, is above its level l
f
j(l−j,µ) that corresponds
to the workers’ full employment Nj = nj.
(ii) When the number of engineers in R&D elsewhere in the world, l−j, is
held constant, labour market regulation in country j (i.e., a higher αj) fosters
R&D and growth in that country, ∂lj/∂αj > 0.
(iii) Simultaneous labour market regulation in all countries (i.e., a higher
αj = α for all j) increases the world growth rate lj = l−j = Zj = Z.
These result are explained in the ﬁnal section.
5 The governments
Because country j consumes its output, yj =
Pκ
ι=1 Cjι obtains. Given the
symmetry across the households in country j, this takes the form Cjι = yj/κ.
A household’s consumption Cjι relative to the level of productivity, γt, is
given by cj
. = γ−tCjι. This, Cjι = yj/κ, (1), (10) and (24) produce









1−β/[(1 − β)κ] with ∂cj/∂lj < 0. (28)








According to proposition 1(i), the full employment constraint takes the
form lj ≥ l
f
j(l−j,µ). Given proposition 1(ii), the government in country j
(hereafter government j) can increase (decrease) the number of engineers in
R&D, lj, by labour market regulation (deregulation). If the government is
benevolent, it maximizes social welfare (29) by lj subject to lj ≥ l
f
j(l−j,µ),
given the number of engineers devoted to R&D elsewhere, l−j. Denoting the
value of the state of technology t for government j by Υj(t), the Bellman











σt + λZj(lj,l−j,µ)[Υj(t + 1) − Υj(t)]. (30)




















We try the solution that the value function is of the form Υj(t) = ϑcσ
jγσt,
where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. In Ap-
pendix D, this solution yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) If labour market regulation is carried out at the level of
single country and the dependence on the rest of the world increases (i.e.,
µ rises), then the employment of engineers in R&D falls, dlj/dµ < 0.
(ii) If the elasticity of consumption with respect to the interest rate, η . =
(r/c)dc/dr, is smaller (greater) than 1/σ, where 1/(1 − σ) is a household’s
rate of risk aversion, then it is welfare enhancing to regulate (deregulate) the
labour market simultaneously in all countries j.
A government faces a trade-oﬀ between rapid technological change and low
income. When technological change in a country depends less on foreign
R&D and more on domestic R&D (i.e, a higher µ), it is more attractive
12for the government to speed up technological change through lower income
and consequently, there will be more engineers in R&D. In a stationary
equilibrium the level of utility (14) takes the form Uj = cσ
j/rj. If the interest
rate rj (as being a function of the growth rate lj) is chosen to maximize utility
Uj, the ﬁrst-order condition ∂Uj/∂rj = 0 implies η . = (rj/cj)∂cj/∂rj = 1/σ.
When labour market regulation is coordinated across countries 1,...,J,
we obtain the Pareto optimum for the whole world. The governments then
behave as if there were only one government in the world and µ → 0 holds.
Because lj|µ=0 > lj|µ>0 by proposition 2(i), there will be more engineers and
consequently a higher growth rate lj = l−j = Zj = Z than with independent
governments. From proposition 1(ii) it follows that to increase lj to the
level corresponding to the Pareto optimum, each independent government j
should increase its αj. Hence, the following corollary is established:
Proposition 3 The international coordination of labour market policy speeds
up economic growth (i.e., increases Z). Independent national governments
tend to overly deregulate their labour markets (i.e., to choose too low αj).
This result is explained in the ﬁnal section.
6 Conclusions
This paper examined a world that has the following properties. First, growth
is generated by creative destruction: a ﬁrm creating the newest technology
by a successful R&D project crowds out the other ﬁrms with older technolo-
gies from the market so that the latter lose their value. Second, wages are
determined by collective bargaining. Third, the ﬁrms ﬁnance their R&D by
selling shares, and the households save only by buying these shares. Fourth,
the households choose optimally their supply two primary inputs: engineers
which are used both in production and R&D; and workers which are em-
ployed only in production. The main ﬁndings of the paper were as follows.
Labour market deregulation, which weakens the unions and increases the
employment of the workers, slows down economic growth in two ways. First,
with lower unemployment for the workers, the households will more likely to
remain workers and less likely to become engineers. Second, because the two
13labour inputs are complements in production, a higher level of employment
for the workers increases also the demand for engineers in the production
sector. Since the former eﬀect reduces the supply of engineers and the latter
transfers these from R&D into production, the number of engineers devoted
to R&D will fall. With a lower level of R&D, there will be less innovations
and the growth rate will fall. Correspondingly, it can be shown that labour
market regulation, which strengthens the unions and decreases the employ-
ment of the workers, speeds up growth. From these results it follows that
if the growth rate is above (below) the optimal growth rate of the economy,
then the labour market should be deregulated (regulated).
If the countries regulate their labour markets independently, then in-
creased dependence of countries slows down but international coordination
of labour market policy speeds up economic growth. This is because a gov-
ernment faces a trade-oﬀ between rapid technological change and low current
income. When technological change in a country depends more on foreign
R&D and less on domestic R&D, the trade-oﬀ becomes more restrictive and
the government must slow down technological change through deregulation.
With international coordination, the externality caused by the dependence
of countries can be internalized. The trade-oﬀ then becomes less restrictive
for the governments taken together, which means that these can speed up
technological change through regulation. In other words, independent local
governments will overly deregulate the labour market when compared to the
case of international cooperation.
Finally, the world can be divided into regulation and deregulation regimes
as follows. If the elasticity of consumption with respect to the interest rate
is below (above) some critical level, then regulation (deregulation) that in-
creases (decreases) the unions’ bargaining power in the labour market is wel-
fare enhancing. The interest rate is a function of the growth rate. Because
in a stationary state the level of utility is equal to some function of consump-
tion (which correspond instantaneous utility), divided by the interest rate,10
there exists utility-maximizing levels for the interest rate and the growth
rate, at which the interest-elasticity of consumption is equal to the critical
10Because we have chosen the households’ aggregate spending as the numeraire, current
expenditure on consumption is equal to future expenditure. This means that utilities can
be discounted by the interest rate.
14level. If the interest-elasticity of consumption is below the critical level, then
the growth rate is above its utility-maximizing level and the labour markets
should be deregulated to slow down growth.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
growth model is used to draw conclusions about the eﬀects of public policy,
the following judgement nevertheless seems to be justiﬁed. With greater
international externality in technological change, it is a good idea to increase
international cooperation in labour market policy.
Appendix A
Let us denote variables depending on technology t by superscript t. Since
according to (18) income At









































jι = 0. (34)







































































j) and a household’s expenditure share, Ct
jι/yt
j,11 are invariant
11The domestic households consume the domestic output.
15across technologies. Given (5), (6), (8), (9), (18) and (32), this implies
l
t
j = lj, n
t
j = nj, m
t
j = mj, x
t
j = xj, Z
t
j = Zj, ψ
t





j = wj, Π
t
j = Πj, π
t







































j = γ. (37)
Inserting (32), (33) and (37) into equation (20), we obtain

























σ[ρ − rjι + (1 − γ
σ)λZj]/rjι.
This leads to the function
rj = rjι = ρ + (1 − γ
σ)λZj. (38)





















































Because the shares in domestic ﬁrms are the only assets for the households,
in equilibrium wjlj =
Pκ
ι=1 Sjι must hold. This,
Pκ












Ajι = wjlj + ψjxj + Πj + πj
16and
wjlj/(ψjxj) = (hj − 1)(ψjxj + Πj + πj)/(ψjxj) = $(hj − 1), (40)
where $ . = 1 + β/(1 − β) + β/(1 − β)2 > 0. Noting (39), (40) and (38),


















ρ/Zj + (1 − γσ)λ
(41)
obtains. Because hj > 1, equation (41) deﬁnes a function hj = h(Zj) > 1
with h0 > 0. Inserting this into (40) produces (23).
Appendix B











































Taking a logarithm of these and noting (4), we obtain a system of three
equations,
log[−N
0(l + m)] − logN(l + m) + (1/ε)log m + (1 − 1/ε)log n = constants,
(1/ε − 1)log x − (1/ε)log m + log l − log[h(Z) − 1] = constants,
X(m,n) − x = 0, (42)
with endogenous variables m, n and x and exogenous variables l and Z.















































































































































From (9) and (25) it follows that in full employment there is
N(lj + m(lj,Zj(lj,l−j,µ))) = Nj = nj = n(lj,Zj(lj,l−j,µ)).
This equation deﬁnes the function lj = l
f
j(l−j,µ). Given (5), (6), (8), (9),
(24) and (26), the logarithm of the product Uα
j F
1−α
j takes the form
Γj(lj,l−j,αj,µ) . = αj log Uj + (1 − αj)log Fj
= log B
0
















− log[% + (1 − γ)λZj] + Θ
= αj log(ψj/vj)
ε−1 + log x
1−β
j − log[% + (1 − γ)λZj] + Θ
= −αj log[δ(wj/vj)





+ 1 − δ
o
+ (1 − β)logx(lj,Zj)
− log[% + (1 − γ)λZj] + Θ, (43)
where Θ consists of terms that are independent of lj.
Because a logarithm is an increasing transformation, the outcome of bar-
gaining is obtained by maximizing the function (43) by lj, subject to (25)
and (27), taking l−j as given. The Lagrangean of this problem is given by
L . = Γj(lj,l−j,αj,µ) + ξ[N(lj + m(lj,Zj)) − n(lj,Zj)]





where multipliers ξ and ϕ satisfy Kuhn-Tucker conditions
ξ[N(lj + m(lj,Zj)) − n(lj,Zj)] = 0, ξ ≥ 0,
ϕ[Uj(lj,l−j,αj,µ) − Uj(˜ lj,l−j,αj,µ)] = 0, ϕ ≥ 0. (45)














∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj = N
0(lj + mj)[1 + ∂m/∂lj] − ∂n/∂lj.
Subresult: ∂2Γj/(∂lj∂αj) > 0 holds when there is unemployment Nj > nj.
Assume on the contrary that ∂2Γj/(∂lj∂αj) ≤ 0 holds. Because limα→1 Γj =





















To prove ∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj < 0, assume on the contrary that
∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj ≥ 0, (48)









































which is in contradiction with (27). So there must be
∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj < 0. (50)



















≤ (1 + ϕUj)
∂Γj
∂lj















This means that if the function (43) is maximized by lj, then there must be
lj = l
f
j and full employment. Hence, ∂2Γj/(∂lj∂αj) ≤ 0 cannot hold with
unemployment lj 6= l
f
j, and the subresult is proven.





δ(wj/vj)1−ε + 1 − δ
∂(wj/vj)
∂lj


















   
αj<1
. (53)
To prove ∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj > 0, assume on the contrary that
∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj ≤ 0 (54)









































which is in contradiction with (27). Hence, inequality (54) cannot hold and
∂(Nj − nj)/∂lj > 0 (56)
20is true. Given (25) and (56), lj cannot be below l
f
j(l−j,µ).
Result (ii). Assume unemployment Nj > nj and lj > l
f
j. The union’s in-
centive constraint (27) is then a strict inequality and the ﬁrst-order conditions
(45) and (46) take the form ∂Γj/∂lj = 0. Given (52) and the second-order
condition ∂2Γj/∂l2














Results (iii). Now we examine the equilibrium of the world in the case
αj = α for all j, in which all countries j ∈ [0,1] are in symmetric position.
Given the functions (57), we deﬁne a system of equations
∆j = lj − l
∗
j(l−j,α,µ) = 0 for all j, (58)





. The reaction function of country j is given
by (58). The suﬃcient conditions for the stability of the equilibrium require




is subject to diagonal dominance.12






























j/∂l−j < 1. Because of symmetry lj = l−j = l obtains, and we
can transform relations (57) into l = l∗
j(l,α,µ). Diﬀerentiating this totally
and noting (57) and ∂l∗
j/∂l−j < 1 yield






Assume ﬁrst that there is unemployment, lj > l
f
j(l−j,µ). Inserting the
value function Υj(t) = ϑcσ
jγσt and Υj(t + 1)/Υj(t) = γσ into the Bellman
12See, for example, Dixit (1986), p. 117. Here, the diagonal term ∂∆j/∂lj = 1 is
positive so that the sum of each row must be greater than zero.





σ − 1)Υj(t)λZj − ρΥj(t)
= Υj(t)








and ϑ = 1/rj > 0. Given ϑ = 1/rj > 0, (9), (31), Υj(t) = ϑcσ
jγσt and










































































































From (9), (22), (24) and (28) one can see that the functions xj, cj, rj, ∂cj/∂Zj
















< 0 for lj = l−j. (61)
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition ∂Bj/∂lj = 0 and noting (61) and the
second-order condition ∂2Bj/∂l2













< 0 for lj = l−j.
(62)
If ˆ lj(l−j,µ) > l
f
j(l−j,µ), there is unemployment.
We examine now the equilibrium of the world. Because of symmetry
across j, we obtain constant l
f
j(l−j) = lf for all j. Given the functions (62),
we can deﬁne a system of equations
Aj = lj − min[l
f,ˆ lj(l−j,µ)] = 0 for all j, (63)





. The reaction function of country j is given
by (63). The suﬃcient conditions for the stability of the equilibrium require




is subject to diagonal dominance.13




















This implies ∂ˆ lj/∂l−j < 1. Because of symmetry lj = l−j = l obtains, we can
transform relations (62) into l = min[lf,ˆ lj(l,µ)]. Diﬀerentiating this totally
and noting (62), we obtain
lj = min[l(µ),l
f], dl/dµ = (∂ˆ lj/∂µ)/[1 − ∂ˆ lj/∂l−j] < 0.
If l(µ) > lf(µ), there is unemployment.
Finally, we examine optimal worldwide regulation. Because in this case
the governments behaves as if there were only one government in the world,
we let µ → 0. Given the symmetry across countries j, equations (9) and
(22) yield Cj = C, lj = l−j = Zj = Z and rj = r = ρ + (1 − γσ)λZ for
all j. Noting γσ > 1, (22), (24), (28) and (60), we obtain the elasticity of


























































σ − 1)(1 − µ) = (1 − γ
σ)λ[ση − 1].





According to proposition 1(ii), this means that the labour market should be
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